


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PTO/SB/33 (07-05)

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**PRE-APPEAL BRIEF REQUEST FOR REVIEW**

Docket Number (Optional)

CLFR:263USC6

I hereby certify that this correspondence is being deposited with the United States Postal Service with sufficient postage as first class mail in an envelope addressed to "Mail Stop AF, Commissioner for Patents, P.O. Box 1450, Alexandria, VA 22313-1450" [37 CFR 1.8(a)]

on May 26, 2006

Signature

Typed or printed name David L. Parker

Application Number

10/717,243

Filed

November 18, 2003

First Named Inventor

Marc D. Better

Art Unit

1644

Examiner

Huynh, Phuong N.

Applicant requests review of the final rejection in the above-identified application. No amendments are being filed with this request.

This request is being filed with a notice of appeal.

The review is requested for the reason(s) stated on the attached sheet(s).

Note: No more than five (5) pages may be provided.

I am the

☐

applicant/inventor.

☐

assignee of record of the entire interest.

See 37 CFR 3.71. Statement under 37 CFR 3.73(b) is enclosed.  
(Form PTO/SB/96)☒

attorney or agent of record.

Registration number 32,165

☐

attorney or agent acting under 37 CFR 1.34.

Registration number if acting under 37 CFR 1.34

Signature

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Typed or printed name

512-536-3055

Telephone number

May 26, 2006

Date

NOTE: Signatures of all the inventors or assignees of record of the entire interest or their representative(s) are required.  
Submit multiple forms if more than one signature is required, see below\*.

☐

\*Total of forms are submitted.

This collection of information is required by 35 U.S.C. 132. The information is required to obtain or retain a benefit by the public which is to file (and by the USPTO to process) an application. Confidentiality is governed by 35 U.S.C. 122 and 37 CFR 1.11, 1.14 and 41.6. This collection is estimated to take 12 minutes to complete, including gathering, preparing, and submitting the completed application form to the USPTO. Time will vary depending upon the individual case. Any comments on the amount of time you require to complete this form and/or suggestions for reducing this burden, should be sent to the Chief Information Officer, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Department of Commerce, P.O. Box 1450, Alexandria, VA 22313-1450. DO NOT SEND FEES OR COMPLETED FORMS TO THIS ADDRESS. SEND TO: Mail Stop AF, Commissioner for Patents, P.O. Box 1450, Alexandria, VA 22313-1450.

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## **Arguments in Support of Pre-Appeal Brief Request for 10/717,243**

### **I. The Written Description of Claims 1-13 is Inappropriate as a Matter of Law**

In the final Action dated March 30, 2006 all of the claims were rejected on the basis of written description. The only basis that we can discern for this rejection is the Examiner's position that the specification does provide a written description of the binding specificity of any antibody, any particular antibody-binding portion such as an Fab fragment, Fd fragment, *etc.* Action, page 2, item 4.

We would note that the present invention, as exemplified by current claim 1, is directed to:

1. A fusion protein comprising gelonin having the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NOS: 2 or 101 and an antibody or region of an antibody comprising an antigen-binding portion.

The key aspect of this invention is simply the use of a gelonin toxin having the specified sequence linked to *any* antibody. This is a traditional way of claiming such "immunotoxins" where one is relying on the specific toxin as the inventive aspect, not the antibody. Furthermore, this has been the acceptable means of claiming such structures throughout the prosecution of this entire family. See, for example, the most immediate past parent of the present application, US 6,649,742, wherein claim 1 reads as follows:

1. A fusion protein comprising gelonin as in SEQ ID NO: 2 or 101 and an antibody or region of an antibody comprising an antigen-binding protein, wherein said antibody or said region is fused to the amino terminus of said gelonin.

As can be seen, the claim structure set forth in that issued patent is almost identical to claim 1 above and the pending dependent claims.

The foregoing is consistent with Federal Circuit caselaw interpreting the law of written description in the context of biotech inventions such as the present one. Instructive in this regard is the Federal Circuit's recent decision in *Capon v. Eshhar v. Dudas*, 418 F.3d 1349, 76 USPQ2d 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2005). As the *Capon* court points out, there is no requirement under written description that a specification contain a detailed description of elements where those elements are well known to those in the field:

The Board stated that "controlling precedent" required inclusion in the specification of the complete nucleotide sequence of "at least one" chimeric gene. Bd. op. at 4. The Board also objected that the claims were broader than the specific examples. Eshhar and Capon each responds by pointing to the scientific completeness and depth of their descriptive texts, as well as to their illustrative examples. The Board did not relate any of the claims, broad or narrow, to the examples, but invalidated all of the claims without analysis of their scope and the relation of claim scope to the details of the specifications.

Eshhar and Capon both argue that they have set forth an invention whose scope is fully and fairly described, for the nucleotide sequences of the DNA in chimeric combination is readily understood to contain the nucleotide sequences of the DNA components. Eshhar points to the general and specific description in his specification of known immune-related DNA segments, including the examples of their linking. Capon points similarly to his description of selecting DNA segments that are known to express immune-related proteins, and stresses the existing knowledge of these segments and their nucleotide sequences, as well as the known procedures for selecting and combining DNA segments, as cited in the specification.

Both parties argue that the Board misconstrued precedent, and that precedent does not establish a *per se* rule requiring nucleotide-by-nucleotide re-analysis when the structure of the component DNA segments is already known, or readily determined by known procedures. The "written description" requirement implements the principle that a patent must describe the technology that is sought to be patented; the requirement serves both to satisfy the inventor's obligation to disclose the technologic knowledge upon which the patent is based, and to demonstrate that the patentee was in possession of the invention that is claimed. See *Enzo Biochem*, 296 F.3d at 1330 (the written description requirement "is the *quid pro quo* of the patent system; the public must receive meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for a limited period of time"); *Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp.*, 214 F.3d 1342, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2000)

(the purpose of the written description requirement “is to ensure that the scope of the right to exclude . . . does not overreach the scope of the inventor's contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification”); *In re Barker*, 559 F.2d 588, 592 n.4 (CCPA 1977) (the goal of the written description requirement is “to clearly convey the information that an applicant has invented the subject matter which is claimed”). The written description requirement thus satisfies the policy premises of the law, whereby the inventor's technical/scientific advance is added to the body of knowledge, as consideration for the grant of patent exclusivity.

The descriptive text needed to meet these requirements varies with the nature and scope of the invention at issue, and with the scientific and technologic knowledge already in existence. The law must be applied to each invention that enters the patent process, for

each patented advance is novel in relation to the state of the science. Since the law is applied to each invention in view of the state of relevant knowledge, its application will vary with differences in the state of knowledge in the field and differences in the predictability of the science.

For the chimeric genes of the Capon and Eshhar inventions, the law must take cognizance of the scientific facts. The Board erred in refusing to consider the state of the scientific knowledge, as explained by both parties, and in declining to consider the separate scope of each of the claims. None of the cases to which the Board attributes the requirement of total DNA re-analysis, *i.e.*, *Regents v. Lilly*, *Fiers v. Revel*, *Amgen*, or *Enzo Biochem*, require a re-description of what was already known. In *Lilly*, 119 F.3d at 1567, the cDNA for human insulin had never been characterized. Similarly in *Fiers*, 984 F.2d at 1171, much of the DNA sought to be claimed was of unknown structure, whereby this court viewed the breadth of the claims as embracing a “wish” or research “plan.” In *Amgen*, 927 F.2d at 1206, the court explained that a novel gene was not adequately characterized by its biological function alone because such a description would represent a mere “wish to know the identity” of the novel material. In *Enzo Biochem*, 296 F.3d at 1326, this court reaffirmed that deposit of a physical sample may replace words when description is beyond present scientific capability. In *Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.*, 314 F.3d 1313, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003) the court explained further that the written description requirement may be satisfied “if in the knowledge of the art the disclosed function is sufficiently correlated to a particular, known structure.” These evolving principles were applied in *Noelle v. Lederman*, 355 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004), where the court affirmed that the human antibody there at issue was not adequately described by the structure and function of the mouse antigen; and in *University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.*, 358 F.3d 916, 925-26 (Fed. Cir. 2004), where the court affirmed that the description of the COX-2 enzyme did not serve to describe unknown compounds capable of selectively inhibiting the enzyme.

The “written description” requirement must be applied in the context of the particular invention and the state of the knowledge. The Board’s rule that the nucleotide sequences of the chimeric genes must be fully presented, although the nucleotide sequences of the component DNA are known, is an inappropriate

generalization. When the prior art includes the nucleotide information, precedent does not set a *per se* rule that the information must be determined afresh. Both parties state that a person experienced in the field of this invention would know that these known DNA segments would retain their DNA sequences when linked by known methods. Both parties explain that their invention is not in discovering which DNA segments are related to the immune response, for that is in the prior art, but in the novel combination of the DNA segments to achieve a novel result.

The “written description” requirement states that the patentee must describe the invention; it does not state that every invention must be described in the same way. As each field evolves, the balance also evolves between what is known and what is added by each inventive contribution. Both Eshhar and Capon explain that this invention does not concern the discovery of gene function or structure, as in *Lilly*. The chimeric genes here at issue are prepared from known DNA sequences of known function. The Board's requirement that these sequences must be analyzed and reported in the specification does not add descriptive substance. The Board erred in holding that the specifications do not meet the written description requirement because they do not reiterate the structure or formula or chemical name for the nucleotide sequences of the claimed chimeric genes.

Applicants highlight a quote from the preceding passage: “None of the cases to which the Board attributes the requirement of total DNA re-analysis, *i.e.*, *Regents v. Lilly*, *Fiers v. Revel*, *Amgen*, or *Enzo Biochem*, require a re-description of what was already known.” While *Capon* dealt with DNA sequences *per se*, we submit that the reasoning is fully consistent with the present case, which concerns the amino acid sequences of antibodies. Moreover, while it is true that claim 1 of the present invention, as well as the claims of the parent ‘742 patent, cover the use of antibodies that might be developed in the future, the same can be said for the genetic elements at issue in *Capon*.

## **II. The Section 112, 2<sup>nd</sup> Paragraph, Rejection of all of the Claims is Similarly Inappropriate as a Matter of Law and there is no Factual Basis set forth**

The Applicants contend that the Section 112, second paragraph, rejection is similarly inappropriate as a matter of law. The claims are intended to be “generic” with respect to the antibody that is employed in the immunotoxin construct. Applicants are unaware of any case

law or PTO rule that requires the insertion of sequence elements into the claim in order to render them definite. Here the claims are directed to immunotoxins composed of a gelonin molecule having a specified sequence together with an antibody, *any* antibody. It is beyond question that those of skill in the art would have no trouble discerning the scope of the claims, and the Examiner has failed to provide any evidence to the contrary. The Examiner merely recites the conclusory statement that “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art cannot appraise the metes and bound of the claimed invention” without any support for this statement.